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The role of corporate governance and boards in 
organisational performance   
Naomi Chambers and Chris Cornforth 
 
[This is a pre-publication version of chapter 6 of Walshe, K., Harvey, G. and Jas, P. 
(eds.) Connecting Knowledge and Performance in Public Services: From Knowing to 
Doing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.] 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
For more than two decades, successive UK governments have been concerned with 
modernising the delivery of public services and seeking performance improvements. 
As part of this drive, corporate governance arrangements across the sector have been 
reformed and much greater attention has been paid to the training, development and 
support of those serving on governing bodies and boards. An underlying assumption 
of these shifts in policy is that improvements in corporate governance arrangements, 
and in particular the working of boards, will lead to improvements in effectiveness. 
This chapter examines what evidence there is to support that assumption. 
 
Before proceeding it is important to be clear about what we mean by corporate 
governance. The term governance has become an important concept in a variety of 
different disciplinary and practice arenas including management, public 
administration, public policy and politics. It has its roots in a Latin word meaning to 
steer or give direction. As Kooiman (1999) notes in a useful review article the term is 
used in a number of different ways which can lead to confusion. He suggests one 
useful way of distinguishing between different usages is in terms of levels of analysis. 
The focus here is on the organisational level, and the term corporate governance will 
be used to refer to the structures, systems and processes concerned with ensuring the 
overall direction, control and accountability of an organisation. It is important to 
distinguish this from the terms used at higher levels of analysis to refer to new 
patterns of government and governing, in particular the shift away from the unitary 
state to a more fragmented and arms-length system of government where a range of 
non-governmental bodies participate in the delivery of public services and policy 
formulation (Rhodes, 1994). These new patterns of political governance and public 
service delivery are of course an important part of the context in which the corporate 
governance of public bodies and agencies takes place. 
 
The language used to refer to the governing body and those that act as governors 
varies widely across the public sector, for example council, governing body and 
board. In this chapter we will use the terms ‘governing body’ or ‘board’ to refer to the 
body at the organisational level with the overall responsibility for directing and 
controlling the organisation, and governor or board member for those elected or 
appointed to the governing body. In this chapter the focus is particularly on the role 
these boards play in performance improvement. 
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In the private sector modern systems of corporate governance evolved with the 
increasing separation of ownership from the control in ‘public’ companies. As owners 
became separate from those that managed companies the shareholders appointed 
boards to act on their behalf, and wider systems of reporting, regulation and audit 
were developed to try to ensure corporations were run in their owners’ interest and 
subject to constraints of the law (Pointer, 1999). In the UK, companies have unitary 
boards consisting of executive and independent or non-executive directors (NEDs). 
Many of the recent corporate governance reforms in the private sector ( for example 
Higgs, 2003) have been concerned with strengthening the position of NEDs, so they 
are better able to hold executives to account. 
 
There are parallels in the development of democratic government and public services. 
As public institutions developed it became necessary to put in place people who could 
run and control those institutions on behalf of the public. In central and local 
government these ‘governors’ are elected through public vote. However, since the 
1980s with the advent of ‘New Public Management’ ( Ferlie et al, 2005) government 
has reformed the way many public bodies are structured and governed. There has 
been an increase in the formation of public bodies that operate at arms length from 
government and a move away from having elected governors to public appointments 
or other hybrid systems of choosing members of governing bodies. A number of these 
reforms were modelled on private sector practices and the language and many of the 
private sector practices of corporate governance have become commonplace in many 
parts of the public sector. 
 
One important difference between organisations in the public sector and those in the 
private sector is that they are not fully independent, but are subject to a degree of 
political direction and control from government. Hence, the governing bodies of 
public service organisations are often constrained in their ability to steer the 
organisation, for example by central government funding decisions and policies. 
There are also considerable differences in governance arrangements and the degree of 
central government direction and control between different fields of public service. 
Although it is now more common for executives to have a place on governing bodies 
of public organisations they are usually very much in the minority except in the health 
sector. 
 
The language used to refer to the governing body and those that act as governors 
varies widely across the public sector. In this chapter we will use the terms governing 
body or board to refer to the body at the organisational level with the overall 
responsibility for directing and controlling the organisation, and governor or board 
member for those elected or appointed to the governing body. 
 
The chapter is divided into five sections. Section two focuses on theory and compares 
contrasting theories of corporate governance and what they have to say about the link 
between the board’s role and performance. A fundamental issue is the relationship 
between boards and management and what influence boards actually have. Section 
three gives a brief historical overview of some of the main corporate governance 
reforms and developments in the public sector in recent years. It highlights a number 
of common trends such as the move to smaller boards and development of codes of 
practice, but notes that there are considerable variations in different fields of activity 
such local government, health, education and partnerships. Section four examines 
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empirical evidence of the relationship between governance and performance 
improvement. Section five draws out some of the main lessons from this analysis of 
the theory and evidence, and discusses the main implications for policy and practice. 
2. Theoretical perspectives on corporate governance 
 
As noted above one of the major changes in government since the 1980s has been the 
transfer of many public activities from direct government control to quasi-
governmental organisations that operate with their own boards, many of whose 
members are not directly elected by the public (Skelcher, 1998). At the same time 
there has been a growing adoption of private sector practices in the public sector, and 
many governance reforms have borrowed from the private sector. It is therefore 
relevant to ask whether theories of corporate governance that developed in the private 
sector can help shed a light on the challenges for corporate governance in the public 
sector and whether good governance can improve the performance of public sector 
organisations. Four sets of theories seem particularly relevant in trying to understand 
the relationship between boards and performance: agency theory, stewardship theory, 
board roles and theory about board power. 
2.1 Agency theory  
Principal - agent theory, or agency theory for short, has been the dominant theory of 
corporate governance arrangements in the economics and finance literature. It is based 
on the assumption that the owners of an enterprise (the principal) and those that 
manage it (the agent) will have different interests. Hence the owners or shareholders 
of any enterprise face a problem that managers are likely to act in their own interests 
rather than to benefit shareholders. While free markets are seen as the best restraint on 
managerial discretion, agency theory sees corporate governance arrangements as 
another means to ensure that management acts in the best interests of shareholders 
(see Keasey et al, 1997: 3-5). In this perspective the board is central to corporate 
governance arrangements, and its main function is to act as a monitoring device to 
control management. This suggests that a majority of board members of companies 
should be independent of management, and that the primary role of these NEDs is to 
ensure managerial compliance, that is to monitor and if necessary control the 
behaviour of management to ensure it acts in the shareholders’ best interests. 
 
One difficulty in applying agency theory to public service organisations is that there is 
much more potential ambiguity over who the principals are. Is it for example the 
general public, taxpayers, users of the services or the government itself? Nevertheless, 
many aspects of this perspective still have relevance. It can still be argued that the 
mission and objectives of public service organisations are at risk from managers 
pursuing their own interests or not managing the organisation efficiently and 
effectively, and so a key role of the governing body is again to monitor management 
and ensure their compliance in furthering the organisation’s objectives. 
2.2 Stewardship theory  
Stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Muth and Donaldson, 1998) is 
grounded in a human relations perspective (Hung, 1998) and starts from opposite 
assumptions to agency theory. It assumes that in general managers are motivated by 
more that their own narrow economic self-interest. Managers want to do a good job 
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and will act as effective stewards of an organisation’s resources. As a result 
executives and shareholders of the organisation are better seen as partners. Hence, the 
main function of the board is not to ensure managerial compliance, but to improve 
organisational performance. Applying this perspective to the public sector the role of 
a governing body is primarily strategic, to work with top management to set the 
direction of the organisation, add value to top decisions and improve performance.  
2.3 The ‘conformance’ and ‘performance’ dimensions of board 
governance roles 
Both agency theory and stewardship theory, (along with other theories of corporate 
governance) have been criticised for only illuminating particular aspects of corporate 
governance and board roles. As a result there have been calls for frameworks that 
combine the insights of different theories (Hung, 1998: 108; Tricker, 2000: 295; 
Cornforth, 2003:11). 
 
One useful model that helps integrate the insights of these different theories has been 
put forward by Garratt (1997) drawing on an earlier model by Tricker (1980). Garratt 
suggests there are two main dimensions of the boards role, what he calls 
‘conformance’ and ‘performance’. Conformance involves two main functions 
external accountability including compliance with legal and regulatory requirements 
and accountability to shareholders or other stakeholders, and supervision of 
management through monitoring performance and making sure that there are adequate 
internal controls. This conformance dimension matches quite closely with agency 
theory perspective on governance. In contrast the performance dimension is about 
driving the organisation forward to better achieve its mission and goals. This again 
consists of two main functions policy formulation and strategic thinking to take the 
organisation forward. The performance dimension is in keeping with stewardship 
theory of corporate governance. These four main functions of boards are shown 
diagrammatically in figure 1. This framework suggests that boards need to be 
concerned with both the conformance and performance dimensions of corporate 
governance. 
 
 Short term focus on 
‘conformance’ 
Long term focus on 
‘performance’ 
 
 
External 
focus 
Accountability 
• Ensuring external accountabilities 
are met, e.g. to stakeholders, 
funders, regulators. 
• Meeting audit, inspection and 
reporting requirements 
 
Policy formulation 
• Setting and safeguarding the 
organisation’s mission and values 
• Deciding long-term goals 
• Ensuring appropriate policies and 
systems in place 
 
 
 
Internal 
focus 
Supervision 
• Appointing and rewarding senior 
management 
• Overseeing management 
performance 
• Monitoring key performance 
indicators 
• Monitoring key financial and 
budgetary controls 
• Managing risks 
Strategic thinking 
• Agreeing strategic direction 
• Shaping and agree long-term plans 
• Reviewing and deciding major 
resource decisions and 
investments. 
     Figure 1: The main functions of boards (adapted from Garratt, 1997:45-7) 
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What do these theories have to say about the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance? Agency theory with its emphasis on conformance 
suggests that the monitoring role of the board, supported by processes such as external 
audit and reporting requirements, is likely to reduce problems of management 
pursuing their own interests or performing poorly. The emphasis is on avoiding 
performance problems stemming from poor management or inappropriate use of 
managerial discretion. Interestingly much of the recent interest in improving corporate 
governance in both the private and public sectors has been stimulated by high profile 
failures and scandals. 
 
In contrast, stewardship theory’s emphasis on strategic performance suggests the main 
role of boards is to improve long-term performance by the board working with 
management to develop appropriate policies and strategies. Hence, rather than 
avoiding poor performance or managerial failures the emphasis is on improving future 
performance. 
 
Despite their different emphases both theories assume that non-executive board 
members are able to exercise influence over senior management, and that it is through 
this influence on management that they are able to bring about change and influence 
organisational performance. However, other corporate governance theories, which 
focus on the relative power of non-executive board members with respect to 
management, seriously question whether boards are able to exert significant influence 
on management. 
2.4 Theories of board power 
The dominant theory of board power has been managerial hegemony theory, which 
relates back to the thesis of Berle and Means (1932) that although shareholders may 
legally own large corporations they no longer effectively control them, that control 
having been effectively ceded to a new professional managerial class. This theory 
suggests that managers, through their professional knowledge and control of key 
power sources such as information and other organisational resources, are able to 
exert most influence over key organisational decisions. Over time a variety of 
empirical studies have, with a few caveats, lent support to this thesis.  For example 
Mace (1971) in his study of US directors concluded that boards did not get involved 
in strategy except in crises, and that control rested with the president (chief executive) 
rather than the board. Herman (1981) came to similar conclusions but argued that 
managerial power was always in the context of various constraints and the latent 
power of stakeholders such as external board members.  From this perspective the 
board ends up as little more than a ‘rubber stamp’ for management’s decisions. Its 
function becomes essentially symbolic to give legitimacy to managerial decisions. 
 
Although this theory was developed with respect to large business corporations, many 
of the processes it describes are just as relevant to public institutions: for example the 
separation of the public or users of public service organisations from those that 
control them, and the increasing growth and professionalisation of public 
management. Indeed it can be argued that the largely voluntary and lay nature of 
board involvement in public sector may mean that board members power is even 
more limited than in the private sector. Various empirical studies have lent at least 
some support to that thesis (e.g. Peck, 1995; Steele and Parston, 2003) 
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However, there has been stream of thinking that whilst recognising the considerable 
power that executives can often wield, has challenged the view that non-executive 
board members are powerless. Zald (1996) supports a contingency approach to board 
power relations arguing that power relations will be shaped by contextual, situational 
and personal variables. The contingent nature of board power relations has been 
supported by a number of recent empirical studies. Most notably, Pettigrew and 
McNulty (1995, 1998) argue that board power is shaped by contextual and situational 
variables and the will and skill of board members in building up and mobilising power 
resources. Like other studies (e.g. Lorsch and McIver, 1989) they recognise the 
influence of non-executives is likely to peak in times of transition and crisis. They 
also suggest it is easier for non-executives to exercise negative influence by refusing 
to sanction proposals than exercise positive influence. Stiles and Taylor (2001) in 
their research on private sector boards also conclude that non-executive board 
members are able to constrain managerial opportunism, by establishing organisational 
values, setting the boundaries for key decisions and proposals and using control 
mechanisms to keep a focus on organisational goals and performance. 
 
While agency theory and stewardship theory highlight some of the different ways in 
which boards may attempt to influence management and subsequently organisational 
performance, these theories of board power suggest this influence cannot be taken for 
granted, but will be dependent on a range of contextual, situational factors and the 
skill and will of board members to develop and use various power resources. 
Furthermore, and seemingly obvious, these sets of theories indicate at least the 
potential -  if not the practice -  for boards to exert considerable influence on the 
performance of the organisation which they are there to govern. The rest of the 
chapter will examine the changing structures of boards in the public sector sphere. 
Given the growing convergence between private and public sector models of board 
structures, the literature relating to boards and performance in the private sector is 
examined, and finally the extent to which there is evidence about whether and how 
the new public boards are impacting on performance.  
3. Corporate governance reforms in public sector services 
 
A new conception of public administration from the 1980s onwards (Hood, 2005) was 
accompanied by structural reforms in the way in which public sector services were 
governed. Based on the main tenets of New Public Management, this involved the 
deployment of private sector models of management and organisation (Ferlie,1996). 
Mindful that the focus here is on governance at the level of local organisations, rather 
than at government civil service level, whether arms length or non-governmental 
bodies, three sectors are explored, local government, health and education. The 
rationale for the choice of sub-sectors relates to their significance, in terms of volume 
and impact, as providers of public services. In addition there is a brief review of 
partnership organisations and their boards.  
 
3.1 Local Government 
In local government organisations, the notion of elected members or councillors, 
working collectively as a non-executive council and supported by professional civil 
servant bureaucrats has endured. More recently in the UK, the Local Government Act 
(2000) requires that all local authorities move away from the traditional committee 
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style of decision-making, where all members had a formal decision making role, to 
one of four executive models, that is, leader and cabinet, mayor and cabinet, mayor 
and council manager, or alternative arrangements, with other elected members 
adopting a non- executive scrutiny role. Early findings 
(www.local.odpm.gov.uk/research) suggest that four out of five councils have opted 
for a leader and cabinet model, with only one authority going for a mayor and council 
manager approach.  
 
At the same time, whilst still explicitly 'serving' the council, the local authority chief 
executive role itself has also shifted over the years from an essentially administrative 
role of 'town clerk' to having a more policy-shaping and strategic emphasis. This 
echoes Hill's analysis of the central government civil servant who plays a more 
extended part in relation to policy implementation than as mere administrator (Hill, 
2005). It was also previsaged by recommendations which were accepted in the health 
care sector in the groundbreaking Griffiths Report (1983) written by an ex chief 
executive of the Sainsburys supermarket chain that the NHS would benefit from a 
general management approach to drive its business.  
In addition to legislation requiring the reorganization of decision-making structures, 
the 2000 Act also required every local authority to adopt a Code of Conduct that sets 
out rules governing the behaviour of its members. All elected, co-opted and 
independent members of local authorities, including parish councils, fire, police and 
national park authorities, are covered by the Code.  
3.2 Health Services 
In health, having adopted a private sector and smaller board member model in place 
of the stakeholder model for its local bodies in 1990, the English NHS moved quickly 
to embrace lessons from the corporate failures of the 1990s. Key recommendations 
from the Cadbury Report (1992) to separate the roles of chair and chief executive, and 
to strengthen audit and establish remuneration committees were swiftly adopted.  One 
of the products of the Nolan Committee report on standards in public life, the Code of 
Conduct, with its crucial public sector values of accountability, probity and openness, 
first issued in 1994, remains – with some updating - in force (Code of Conduct, Code 
of Accountability in the NHS, 2004).  
   
Local boards in the English NHS are derived in structure from the Anglo-Saxon 
private sector unitary board model which predominates in UK and US business (Ferlie 
et al, 1996, Garratt, 1997). The unitary board typically comprises a chair, chief 
executive, executive directors and independent (or non-executive) directors who are, 
with the chair, in the majority. All members of the board bear the same responsibility, 
individually and collectively, for the performance of the organisation. Despite 
successive reorganisations in the NHS this model has survived more or less intact 
since 1990, although an alternative governance model is now being developed with 
the introduction of NHS Foundation Trusts.  
 
NHS Foundation Trusts are independent public benefit corporations modelled on co-
operative and mutual traditions. In part they are a response to criticisms of a lack of 
local accountability of boards in the NHS. Although subject to national targets and 
standards, they have greater freedoms than other types of NHS hospitals. They were 
created to devolve decision-making from central government control to local 
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organisations and communities so they are more responsive to the needs and wishes 
of their local people. The introduction of NHS foundation trusts represents a profound 
change in the way in which hospital services are managed and provided.  Governance 
arrangements are locally determined and board members are appointed by the 
governors of the hospitals, rather than by the NHS Appointments Commission, but 
there is still a requirement for non executive directors to outnumber executive 
directors.  
 
3.3 Education 
In education, since the Education Reform Act 1988, government reforms have 
devolved key responsibilities from local education authorities to governing bodies 
within schools in England and Wales. These school governing bodies are now 
corporate bodies. The term 'local management of schools' came into being with 
evolving school-level responsibility for finance and staffing, and by implication, 
responsibility for the quality of education provision. Three main roles for governing 
bodies of schools now are to set the strategic framework within which the head 
teacher will manage the school on a daily basis, to act as a critical friend, by 
supporting the work of the school, while offering an element of challenge through 
regular monitoring and evaluation of progress against agreed objectives, and to ensure 
accountability through the provision of information both to, and from, the governing 
body (www.teachingexpertise.com). In terms of being held to account, and in a 
further decentralising twist, there is some evidence to suggest that governors have a 
stronger sense of accountability to parents and students rather than to government, 
inspecting bodies or to local education authorities (Farrell and Law,1997). 
The composition of school governing bodies is in marked contrast to health trusts as 
the stakeholder model remains strongly embedded with typically up to eight 
categories of governors from the different constituencies of interest ( for example, 
staff, parent, education authority, faith group and so on) and between nine to twenty 
governors depending on the size and category of school(www.teachingexpertise.com).  
The governing bodies of the new  school academies set up to take over failing schools 
in deprived areas and with private sponsorship funding  mark a radical departure from 
this approach and draw upon models from the third sector. Academies are state-
funded all-ability schools but they are also companies limited by guarantee with 
charitable status. They have smaller boards and the sponsor is allowed, in agreement 
with government, to appoint the majority of the trustees (governors) and to determine 
the governance arrangements. There are plans to have 200 academies in England by 
2010 (www.standards.dfes.gov.uk).  
3.4 Partnerships 
The use of networks as a way of coordinating and delivering public services has 
increasingly come under the spotlight both in the academic and public management 
practitioner communities (Klijn, 2005). A manifestation of this is the recent 
phenomenon in English local governance of the growth of local partnership bodies 
which have been formed in attempts to mitigate the problems of service fragmentation 
and the risks of service failures. These can vary along a continuum from informal 
information sharing to formal merger and, in terms of breadth, range from two 
agencies coming together (for example in Mental Health and Social Care Trusts) to a 
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multi-agency partnership (for example Local Safeguarding Children Board). The 
boards of these partnership organisations vary as greatly in their membership. 
(Glasby, 2006).  
Four main trends can be detected from this brief review of new structures and 
working arrangements for public sector boards: the continuous devolution of 
functions, whilst government sets targets and monitors performance ever more 
closely, the development of codes of practice to guide the standards of board 
members' conduct, the gradual adoption of private sector styles of working, and the 
move towards the creation of smaller but more powerful boards. The evidence is 
generally weak but there is some suggestion, which will be explored further below, 
that these trends are associated with marginal improvements in organizational 
performance.   
4. Evidence on the relationship between governance and 
performance 
 
A search of relevant databases reveals that the evidence about how public sector 
boards can or do influence organisation performance is tentative and embryonic. The 
practitioner literature is more extensive than the academic literature. This subject is of 
course particularly subject to problems of attribution and may be prone to overstated 
claims for credit when things go well. A way forward can be found however even in 
the light of the paucity of available material by broadening the scope and addressing 
three main questions. First, given the widespread adoption of business models for 
public sector boards which has been described in section three above, what are the 
lessons emerging from research carried out in the private sector on boards and 
performance, particularly in relation to differences in structures, focus of effort and 
behaviours? Second, what are the factors which appear to impact on public sector 
organisation performance which boards, by virtue of the role they might or do play, 
may have influence over? Third, what is indeed emerging about what public sector 
boards in practice do, or do not do, which may have an impact on performance? 
Along the way, the utility of theories of board governance outlined in section three 
will be re-examined in the light of these questions.  
 
4.1 Evidence connecting boards and performance in the private sector 
 
4.1.1 Board structures in the private sector 
Despite legislation in the US and codes of practice in the UK which prescribe good 
practice with regard to board membership and board committees, the quest for the 
ideal board form seems, from the evidence so far, to be as marginally relevant in the 
private sector as, it has been argued, it is in the public sector (Cornforth, 2003). In a 
meta-analytic review of board composition, leadership structure and financial 
performance, Dalton and colleagues found no links between these (Dalton,1998) and 
nor did an analysis a decade later focussing on CEO chair dualities and 
insider/outsider composition (Heracleous, 2008) . 
  
During bad times, however, there is evidence from the work of Perry and Shivdasani 
(2005) that boards with a majority of outside (non executive) directors are more likely 
initiate restructuring, lay offs and secure subsequent improvements in operational 
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performance. The authors conclude that board composition has a material impact on 
board performance. Whilst the relative numbers of outside directors is of interest, this 
may also endorse the different role of boards in times of crisis and the contingent 
nature of board power relations (Lorsch and McIver, 1989; Pettigrew and McNulty, 
1998).  In another study, which connects with the stress-inertia theory outlined by Jas 
and Skelcher (2005), Boeker and Goodstein (1991) found that, amongst hospital 
boards in California, poorer performers were more willing to initiate changes in board 
composition than stronger performers. They concluded that boards do change their 
structures to adapt to environmental contingencies but that the performance of their 
organisation moderated the rate of their response.  
 
Public sector boards are usually constrained in ways that private sector ones are not 
by the fact that their structures are predetermined by statutory guidance. There is 
sometimes (for example governing bodies in the field of school education, and 
particularly for school academies) some leeway in choosing the size and membership 
of the body and its committees. Given some (weak) evidence emerging from the 
private sector, corroborated by the public sector as we shall see below,  about  size of 
boards and the positive impact of having a majority of non executive directors, boards 
may need to consider strategies to mitigate against any potentially deleterious effects 
where this is not the case. This may be particularly pertinent in the health sector 
which has seen board member numbers ‘creep’ upwards, particularly in Primary Care 
Trusts, from the original eleven posited in the 1990 health governance reforms for 
their predecessor bodies, local health authorities.  
 
4.1.2 Board focus in the private sector 
Turning now to board roles, Unseem's research on good practice in the boardroom 
identified a series of actions that are associated with boards of high performing 
organisations (Unseem, 2006). These include having an annual calendar: this echoes 
Garratt's work on board functions and the cycle of board tasks (Garratt, 1997). Clarity 
about matters which should be reserved for the board is important and these include 
areas which are symbolically as well as strategically important. Unseem goes on to 
argue for a relatively hands on approach to strategy formulation and execution, 
including breaking down large strategic decisions into smaller sequential ones for 
board-level consideration, researching and reviewing decision options before 
approving a plan of action, remaining engaged in secondary decisions that flow form 
primary strategic decisions and requesting and evaluating explanations and 
assumptions for proposed executive decisions. Unseem sums up by arguing that 
improved decision-making in the boardroom can be generative as well as protective. 
 
Lorsch and Clark also counsel for more of a focus on the long-term and leadership 
from the board ( Lorsch and Clark, 2008). They argue that there is currently a danger 
of too much board time spent in the area of compliance, and that the board is too 
hands-off in the area of strategy, which risks the destruction of shareholder value in 
the longer term as the organisation, potentially unnoticed, goes into decline. From 
their survey of directors of Fortune 200 companies, they identified three key areas for 
boards: defining the long-term, and taking the lead in finance discussions, strategy 
discussions and developing talent. This all adds up to an assumption here that the 
executive and non executive directors are closely and jointly involved in a common 
endeavour, with more of a focus on  Garratt's 'performance'  rather than conformance 
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half of the dyad. The approach also fits closer to the stewardship than to the agency 
theory highlighted earlier in section three.  
  
4.1.3 Board behaviours in the private sector 
Not all research on the private sector has focussed solely on board structures and 
functions. Roberts and colleagues advocate for a focus on actual effectiveness of the 
working of boards rather than 'distant perceptions of board effectiveness' (Roberts et 
al 2005:s5) Pye and Pettigrew argue that the study of board processes and what 
comprises effective behaviour in different board contexts provides grist for the 
development of an alternative paradigm to the agency theory of boards which has 
dominated the discourse on corporate governance. They further suggest that effective 
boards are more than the sum of their parts and, although this is so far under-
researched and poorly theorised, it is the dynamic of board members working together 
which adds value to the organisation. This dynamic includes non executive directors 
who are 'extraordinary' in terms of their capacity to articulate clearly, their capability 
and their conceptual awareness and whose relationships are characterised by respect, 
trust and integrity (Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). 
 
Roberts and colleagues in their report for the Higgs Review characterise the effective 
non-executive director as 'independent but involved', 'challenging but supportive' and 
'engaged but non-executive'.. These couplets also provide a means of constructing a 
creative tension between agency and stewardship theories of boards and relate also to 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis' (2003) proposal that  boards should practise both control 
(agency) and collaboration (stewardship) behaviours. This also maps on to Garratt's 
notions in his two sets of board tasks regarding monitoring compliance and 
contributing to strategy (Garratt, 1997). Forbes and Milliken (1999) argue that 
effective boards combine task effectiveness with group cohesiveness but that this is 
theorised as curvilinear: both positive interpersonal relations and task oriented 
disagreement are high.  
 
In research which examined the effects of the board's working style on board task 
performance, Gabrielsson and Winlund found that in addition to the significance of 
formal board structures, the level of board member involvement and the extent of 
clearly defined working styles was important (Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000). This 
echoes the argument adduced by Pettigrew and McNulty alluded to earlier about the 
extent to which members have the 'will and skill' to exercise board power. 
 
The admittedly scanty evidence linking behaviours of effective boards in the private 
sector with organisation performance leans towards a comparatively 'hands on' board 
with able and relatively engaged non executive directors. In learning from the private 
sector, this has implications for the workings of public sector boards aiming for 
improved organisation performance and, whether they are called the members and 
officers, the governors and officials, or executive and non executive directors, calls 
for the framing of a new set of relationships between the two constituencies on the 
board. 
 
4.2  Role of boards in public service performance 
What role can public sector boards actually play in performance improvement? 
Boyne's review of the relevant literature argued that although existing evidence on 
determinants of public service improvement was weak, inter-organisational 
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differences are not random. The concept of public service improvement is contestable 
but there are elements likely to be valued by all constituencies. His review selected 
seven headline dimensions of performance: quality and quantity of outputs, efficency, 
equity, outcomes, value for money, and consumer satisfaction. Two sets of variables 
from his work in particular emerge as having the most consistent influence on 
performance: resources and management, whilst the evidence for three others 
(markets, regulation and organisation) was conflicting. His advice to reformers is 
therefore to leave regulation arrangements, organisation and market structures as they 
are and to focus on more resources and better management (Boyne, 2003). There is a 
clear message here for boards in terms of where they should concentrate their energies 
and this relates to both strategy and control. 
 
Davies and colleagues suggest that there is a weak link between governance and 
performance because of context and intervening variables. In their wide ranging 
review (Davies et al, 2005) of different forms of the governance of health care 
organisations, particularly contrasting markets, hierarchies and networks, including an 
examination of the causal chain between governance, incentives and outcomes, they 
found, like Boyne, that management and leadership both matter and markets less so, 
although the impact of different organisation forms and of regulation was more 
complex than the latter would argue. Davies and colleagues raise another issue 
however about what is meant by performance. In a line of thinking which relates to 
Moore's creating public value theories (Moore,1995) they argue for a broader set of 
measures than those ( for example targets) which are defined by the currently elected 
government, and press for linking organisation activity and performance to 
collectively determined goals and the need to encompass 'democratic anchorage' as 
outlined by Skelcher and Mathur (2004). 
 
4.3  Public sector board practices and organisation performance 
Having identified that public boards do have a role in performance improvement, the 
way is clear to determine the evidence for ways in which this function is discharged. 
The relationship between board effectiveness and organisational effectiveness in non-
profit or third sector organisations has been a focus for research, particularly in North 
America (see Ostrower and Stone (2005: 619-623) for a review). As Ostrower and 
Stone note, this research has been bedevilled by the difficulty of defining and 
measuring both board and organisational effectiveness. Many studies have relied on 
the perceptions of key actors, such as chief executives, while a few have also 
attempted to use more objective measures such as financial indicators. Others have 
argued that effectiveness is a social construction and have attempted to use the 
perceptions of number of different stakeholders (Herman and Renz 1997; Herman et 
al, 1997). 
 
Despite these problems, a number of studies have suggested an association between 
board effectiveness and organisational effectiveness using a variety of different 
measures of effectiveness and research approaches. Broadly, exactly as with the 
private sector, the evidence suggests that board processes and inputs, rather than 
structural variables, are most commonly linked with performance. In terms of 
structural variables, a small size and good administrative support for the board emerge 
as having some significance. The board processes can be grouped into three clusters 
around role, setting the organisational culture and board dynamics. One of the most 
frequent findings is that, again similar to the private sector, the board’s involvement 
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in strategic planning is related to organisational effectiveness (Ostrower and Stone, 
2006: 621). Other studies have highlighted the importance of board composition, 
behaviour and culture, for example the important role of the chief executive in helping 
or hindering the development of an effective board (Herman and Heimovics, 1990; 
Chait et al, 1991) or the emergence of a core group of board members that are 
important in getting things done (Murray et al, 1992).  
 
The four areas of board structure, focus, organisation culture and dynamics will each 
be explored in turn in more detail, using emerging findings from within different parts 
of the public sector in relation to the literature on boards and performance. 
 
4.3.1 New forms of public sector governing boards 
Section three above described the new forms of public sector governing boards that 
have developed since the 1980s. There is tentative evidence that new organisational 
forms are connected with improved performance. 
 
In local government, with the advent of cabinet and mayoral forms of governance, 
improvements have been recorded with regard to swifter and more efficient decision 
making and stronger and more focussed leadership, but also there is evidence of 
disengagement of non executive councillors and some confusion about the scrutiny 
role (www.odpm.gov.uk).Greasley and John (2008) noted a long line of literature 
from US urban politics that suggests that strong mayoral structures are associated with 
performance improvements, and found that the number of powers of local government 
leaders was a predictor of public satisfaction and trust. The strengthening of the 
mayoral or cabinet leader role begins to indicate the emergence of a quasi-executive 
role, perhaps akin to the executive chairmen or chairwomen found in some private 
sector organisations and moving into the chief executive space. Interestingly, good 
practice in the private sector argues for the separation of chair and chief executive 
roles.  
 
In the health sector, the newest organisational form is the NHS Foundation Trust 
accountable to the regulator, Monitor, rather than to government. The financial regime 
underpinning Foundation Trusts is significantly more rigorous and the consequent 
expectations by the regulator of board performance in ensuring financial control are 
also therefore markedly enhanced. The plan was for all acute hospital trusts to acquire 
foundation trust status by 2009 but this has now been put back as Monitor has rejected 
or deferred applications and indicated that a significant number of organisations do 
not yet meet the standards required, particularly in terms of soundness of business 
strategy. There is clear evidence (Monitor, 2008) that, in general, Foundation Trusts 
perform better in terms of providing high quality and safe care and value for money 
(although with some notable exceptions). There may be some attributional difficulties 
here as these were high performing organisations prior to becoming Foundation 
Trusts  
In the education sector, The Joseph Rowntree Foundation has reported that school 
governors are under-resourced to carry out their full range of functions and experience 
some confusion over their representative role versus their expert contributions in 
support of the work of the school, and that a smaller and more strategic body may be 
better suited to fulfill the governance requirements (Dean et al, 2007). Both the Centre 
for Public Scrutiny and PriceWaterhouseCoopers have also recommended a more 
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slimline governance model including a separation of the executive and scrutiny 
functions of the governing body (Centre for Public Scrutiny,2006; Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, 2007) which would bring the structure of school bodies more in line with 
local government governance structures.  
 The evidence so far also indicates that school academies, which are allowed much 
smaller boards headed by influential sponsors, have been able to drive up pupils' 
educational attainment faster than the national average but that the intakes in some 
schools have become overall less disadvantaged  ( for example as measured be 
eligibility for free school meals) than before (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2007) which 
may indicate a digression from their original mission. 
The conclusion from this account is that smaller and more powerful boards 
accountable to powerful regulators may have the will and capability to drive through 
performance improvement more easily than their larger albeit more representative 
equivalents. 
 
4.3.2 Roles and focus of high performing public sector boards  
Structures are nevertheless not as critical as the execution of key board functions. It is 
becoming somewhat clearer that board focus on strategy is associated with positive 
organisation performance in the longer term (for example Unseem, 2006 and Lorsch 
and Clark, 2008).  
 
In a study of 21 English NHS Foundation Trust boards, Emslie (2007) used a board 
performance tool which had been developed and widely used in the US (Board Self 
Assessment Questionnaire) and found an association between board and 
organisational performance. The six dimensions of the tool were contextual, 
educational, interpersonal, analytical, political and strategic. Previous research has 
shown that these factors are important in high performing boards (Chait, Holland, and 
Taylor, 1993). Four of these relate broadly to Garratt's four board tasks and the 
remaining two a (educational and interpersonal) are behavioural and mirror the 
increasing understanding about the need for boards to pay attention to group cohesion, 
reflection and development. Using publicly available data about financial and non-
financial performance of Foundation Trusts, Emslie's study found two particular 
associations: firstly that as well as a higher overall score, board attention to the area of 
strategy is strongly linked to good financial performance; secondly, that board focus 
on politics (defined broadly as relationships with internal and external stakeholders) is 
related to higher levels of staff satisfaction. Unfortunately, there was no evidence of a 
link between board performance and patient experience or outcomes, which of course 
is the primary purpose of Trusts.   
 
Like Emslie, McDonagh and Limbdenstock's empirical research found that higher 
performing boards did have better hospital performance ( as measured by the 
Solucient 100 top hospitals ranking), most notably in profitability and lower expenses. 
Perhaps reflecting a very different context, they also found that a more favourable 
ranking was associated with a lower political score (that is less attention paid to  and 
less well developed relations with stakeholders) 
 
There are some worrying signs that the strategy space, either carved out for or by 
them, for public sector boards may not be very great. Addcott explored the role of 
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cancer network boards in London and found limited strategic influence, with 
constraints due to the continued emphasis of centralised performance management 
and structural reconfiguration and a resulting confused and conflictual framework 
(Addcott, 2008). In the school education sector, Farrell found that school governing 
bodies were not involved in strategic leadership or policy direction, with headteachers 
more likely to play the lead role in these areas (Farrell, 2005). In the health sector, a 
documentary analysis of the work of fifteen primary care organisation boards in 
England and Wales uncovered that more attention was paid to 'second order' functions 
such as finance and administration than to clinical and service issues. The authors 
concluded that the board role in setting strategy and monitoring performance may be 
overshadowed by central government's activity in those areas but that the nature of 
their challenge was as part of a 'policy network' in an environment of multiple 
accountabilities rather than a simplistic top down model of an organisation 
accountable to a board (Abbott et al, 2008).  
 
Using a configurational perspective, Lee et al (2008) have developed a taxonomy of 
board roles from a study of 1,334 American hospitals. They describe five distinct 
clusters, determined by the extent to which boards are active in the three areas of 
strategy, evaluation (performance monitoring), and external relations. The five types 
of boards which the authors have identified were: strategic active, evaluative and 
strategic active, balanced active, strategic and external active, and inactive boards. 
These appear to correspond closely to Garratt's four main functions of boards (see 
above) although policy formulation and strategic thinking have been conflated into 
one role. They found an association between environmental characteristics and the 
dominant roles which the boards have assumed, and argue that the effectiveness of the 
board and its impact on performance may be determined by the match between the 
balance of roles taken up by the board, the characteristics, attributes and composition 
of the board and the internal organisational and external environmental conditions. 
 
This suggests that board focus on strategy in the public sphere is as important as it is 
in the private sector, but that it appears more difficult to sustain. 
 
4.3.3  Public boards, organisational culture and performance 
In addition to structure and role, there is growing evidence of a relationship between 
organisation cultures and performance. Research in the health sector is beginning to 
link certain types of culture with different outcomes: in contrast with Ogbanna and 
Harris’ (2000) findings in the private sector, rational (that is goal driven and 
competitive) culture is associated in health service organisations with poorer 
performance; hierarchical cultures are associated with low waiting times and higher 
overall performance; clan cultures are associated with better patient experience and 
staff morale (Davies et al 2007).  
 
Peck and colleagues (2004) argue that boards, as well as their instrumental impact, are 
important as a symbol of social solidarity and that their rituals reflect and reinforce 
different organisation cultures. It follows therefore in terms of organisation 
performance, that boards should have cognisance of the influence of their behaviours 
on organisation culture and, hence, on strategy, performance and outcomes.  
The Audit Commission found in a study examining the role of corporate governance 
in ensuring the quality of services in the public sector that in addition to getting the 
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balance of board tasks right, a culture of accountability with an outward focus and 
effective relationships were all important ( Audit Commission, 2003) 
Since certain leadership styles are also now found to be associated with performance 
(see Peterson et al (2003), Pounder et al (1995) Ogbanna and Harris (2000) for 
examples across different sectors), the role of the board in selecting the chief 
executive and other senior managers and overall talent management should also not 
be underestimated. 
 
4.3.4  Board dynamics 
The enhanced role of the non executive director in times of crisis has already been 
alluded to in the review of the literature about board power. Mordaunt and Cornforth 
(2004) also highlight the role of public boards in failure and turnaround. The role of 
the board committee comes to the fore here as potentially a safer place to ask 
searching pertinent questions which challenge the status quo. Most importantly, the 
authors found that for successful turnaround to happen,  committed, hands on, 
emotionally resilient board members were required with access to know-how and 
willingness to take responsibility and sort things out and able to form a coalition for 
change. Jas and Skelcher (2005) also touch on the need to overcome the status quo in 
conquering poor performance. This requires cognizance of poor performance and 
leadership capability to address it. They elaborate on the "stress-inertia" theory 
whereby change only occurs when performance concerns are greater than the 
resistances applied by inertia.  
 
McDonagh and Limbdenstock (2006) used the same board performance tool to ask a 
similar question of 64 non profit hospitals in the US and compared findings with an 
earlier study of 300 boards. Unlike Emslie, they found that a factor analysis 
comparing two groups revealed a strong single factor of collaborative board 
functioning. This supports the emerging body of knowledge about the necessity of 
group cohesion and positive group dynamics for high performing boards, relating 
most closely to the stewardship theory of boards. 
 
 In a study of primary care organisations, Abbott et al (2008) found that although it 
was part of their remit, board members often avoided a challenging style in their 
relationships with officers, although the possibility that members might challenge did 
affect how business was conducted. One obstacle was relative powerlessness 
particularly in the face of overload of technical information.  The authors did however 
find that the influence of board members in sub-committees was more extensive than 
typically found in the private sector with roles as critical friends rather than as 
scrutineers. They conclude that these boards are better understood as part of a network 
in which accountability is embedded, strategy is emergent and the predominant mode 
is negotiation rather than command and control. This accords with the stewardship 
and stakeholder models of boards rather than agency or managerial hegemony 
theories. It suggests that hands on boards may use their 'will and skill' in more subtle 
ways than via formal board meetings. 
In partnership boards, much research has been taken up with analysing the processes 
rather than the outcomes of partnership working (Dowling et al, 2004). An example of 
'process' preoccupations and tensions between formal and informal communications 
as ways of organising comes out clearly in a review instigated by Mencap of the 
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Learning Disability Partnership Boards which have been in place in England since 
2001. The research concludes that many have struggled with their dual mission of 
effective strategic planning and a place where the voice of users and carers can be 
heard (www.mencap.org.uk).  
Theories around network governance (see for example Klijn) provide an academic 
understanding of the nature of  multi-agency relationships and partnership bodies, 
although the dynamic between the formal and the informal may as yet be under-
researched (Davies et al, 2005).  Multi-level governance highlights the potential 
power of actors who can operate at different levels as well as across agencies (Eising, 
2004).  'Governance between organisations' which comes from the health field 
(Bullivant et al, 2008) provides a response from the management community to the 
governance challenges mounted by  more joint working across organisational 
boundaries and a greater interdependency across agencies on outcomes. 
A paradox remains because of the apparent increasing influence of network and multi-
level governance as evidenced both by formal partnership arrangements and by 
informal 'below the surface' inter-organisational relationships, and which constrains 
the influence of the single organization board with its solo client group or institutional 
focus.  
In conclusion on the topic of board dynamics, research about public and non-profit 
boards mirrors that of the private sector: board behaviour is now identified as a key 
factor in board effectiveness: a combination of high trust, high challenge and high 
engagement appears to be particularly potent. The situation is further complicated in 
the public sector by the need for programme ( which may be delivered by many 
agencies)  as well as institutional effectiveness which calls for the same dynamic to be 
applied across boards and organisations as well as within boards. 
5. Conclusions  
 
There is some evidence from a variety of different fields that there is an association 
between good governance and good organisational performance. It is however 
difficult to prove any simple one-to-one relationship. Many factors potentially can 
affect organisational performance and disentangling a simple causal relationship is 
likely to be a holy grail. Some associations between boards and organisation 
performance are however emerging. 
 
First, there is some association between board structure and performance. Although 
there is no ‘right or wrong’ model in either the public or private sector, there is 
evidence that smaller boards in the public sector with a greater concentration of power 
can achieve organisational improvement more easily. There is also evidence in 
support of having a majority of outside non-executive directors in order to provide 
independent challenge. And the significance of formal and regular functioning of sub 
board committees (such as the audit committee) to carry out some of the monitoring 
activities of the board is growing.  
 
Second, board focus appears to be important.  The emerging evidence is that high 
performing boards concentrate on shaping strategy, resource identification and use, 
 18 
and talent management. They also match the weight attached to different board tasks 
with the prevailing internal situation and external environmental conditions.  
 
Third, in terms of behaviours, board dynamics is emerging as a crucial element with 
group cohesion and a combination of a culture of high trust and high challenge being 
important. This was described in a study by Chambers as the ability to 'have difficult 
conversations without the aftertaste' (Chambers, 2005:12). Where, however, boards 
manage challenge but with low trust or low group cohesion the outcome can be ‘the 
grumpy board’ (Chambers, 2008). There are under-researched subtleties in relation to 
board actions which set the tone for the organisation, and the development of 'under 
the surface' board member relations outside formal board meetings (for example in 
board committees) and across institutions. 
 
The influence of non-executive board members is shaped by contextual and 
situational factors as well as the will and skill of board members in developing and 
using various power sources. Their level of involvement and influence may be greater 
in times of transition or crisis, for example in appointing a chief executive officer or 
responding to performance failures. Nevertheless, to counter the stress-inertia theory,   
it is proposed that even in 'normal times'  boards  still offer a constructive partner to 
managerial power by establishing common values, helping shape strategic decisions, 
keeping management focussed on organisational goals and addressing performance 
problems. It is equally important that executives understand the role of governance 
and are willing to develop an open and constructive working relationship with board 
members.  
 
Two concluding notes of caution need to be sounded. There is no guarantee that 
improving governance will lead to improved organisational performance, although 
there is some evidence of an association between the two. Good governance is better 
seen as one of a range of mechanisms that can help bring about and maintain 
performance improvements. Many of the governance reforms in both the public and 
private sectors have been aimed at strengthening the conformance aspects of 
governance, and while this is important, more emphasis needs be given to 
performance dimension of governance such as strategic thinking, service 
improvements and innovation. Arguments have been made elsewhere, for example by 
Power (1999), about the over emphasis on the rituals of checking verification and 
conformance at the cost of improved long-term performance. This chapter has drawn 
together some evidence to suggest that organisations and boards would do well to 
continue to seek to redress this imbalance.  
 
At the same time it is important to recognise the constraints on the power of board 
members in the public sector - the dependence on management, the part-time and 
often voluntary nature of the role - and not to have unrealistic expectations of boards. 
The effectiveness of boards or governing bodies will depend greatly on receptiveness 
and ability of executives to work constructively with all board members to develop 
group cohesion.  
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Summary Box 
1. Constructing a path which connects structure, roles and behaviours of boards with 
evidence of impact on organisation performance is beset by theoretical difficulties and 
empirical shortfalls 
 
2. Public management reforms in recent years have been accompanied by structural 
changes in public sector boards, governing bodies and councils which have tended 
towards smaller less representational bodies with a greater concentration of 
leadership, with some, albeit early and weak, evidence that this is leading to improved 
performance 
 
3. New public sector boards bear significant resemblance to private sector models of 
corporate governance and therefore evidence about high performance in the latter may 
have relevance for the public sector 
 
4. There is evidence from across different parts of the public sector, which matches 
the private sector, that relatively 'hands-on' and skilled boards especially in the areas 
of strategy, use of resources and talent management is associated with high 
performing organisations 
 
5. There are significant contextual and situational differences which mitigate against a 
'one size fits all' approach to the high performing board 
 
6. Board behaviours as well as board roles are emerging as a critical element, with 
high trust group cohesion as well as constructive challenge, and resistance to stress-
inertia swings, being important 
 
7. Contributions of board members outside formal board meetings within and across 
organisations may also be important and is an area for future research 
 
8. Theories about board roles and board power need to be updated in the light of 
recent evidence about the importance of board dynamics  
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